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Modularity, interfaces definition and the integration of external sources of 
innovation in the automotive industry  
Abstract 
In the last two decad es, the au to industr y has shown a steady increase of vehicle 
development outsourcing and a shift of both pr oduct development tasks and knowledge from  car 
makers to suppliers. This trend has increased the interest toward product m odularity as a tool to 
ease the integration of external sources of inn ovation but, interestingl y enough, there is little  
evidence concerning the benefits of m odularity in inter-firm coordination in the autom otive 
industry. Indeed, although modularity literature considers standard interfaces one of the constitutive 
elements of modularity and a m eans for easing de sign outsourcing, very few studies have analysed 
neither the genesis nor the m icro-dynamics of the in terfaces definition process.  In order to fill this 
research gap, this paper focuses on how assemble rs and suppliers define  the component-vehicle 
interfaces in component co-development projects. This stud y adopts a “quasi-exp erimental design 
approach” and com pares two sim ilar com ponent co-developm ent projec ts (air-conditioning 
systems) carried ou t by a Japanese first-tier su pplier with two European autom akers. Under the 
ceteris-paribus conditions defined by the research design, the empirical evidence derived from  the 
analysis of  the  two p rojects sho ws that,  dif ferently f rom what m odularity the ory c laims: a) 
interfaces d iverge s ignificantly in  the two cas es; b) the interface definition process is neith er 
technologically determined nor the m ere result of product architectural choices; c) the OEMs and 
the supplier’s capabilities, degree of vertical integration, knowledge endowment and strategic focus 
drive the partitioning of the design and engineering tasks, the interfaces definition process, and the 
choice of the inter-firm  coordination m echanisms. Furthermore, while com ponent modularity and 
design ou tsourcing co-vary and  com plement each other in m odularity literatu re, our findin gs 
suggest that they may work as substitutes and are rather difficult to combine. 
Keywords: Component m odularity; interf aces; auto industry; external innovation; inter-firm 
coordination; buyer-supplier relationships. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The integration of external sources of innovation has become a problem that more and more 
firms need to address (Chesbrough, 2003). Inter-organizational integration mechanisms (co-located 
project teams, integrators, resident-engineers, collaborative technologies, IT infrastructures, etc.) 
are by now a classical topic in organization theory and a large body of research has analysed their 
ability to sustain supply relationships capable of spurring inter-firm innovation (Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991; Helper and Sako, 1995). In this respect, product modularity has received much 
attention and has been credited of many advantages.  
For example, modularity supporters claim it can improve the management and the outputs of 
the new product development (NPD) activities by: a) allowing firms to easily de-couple both the 
design and the manufacturing of the components that constitute a product; b) ensuring an easy and 
well performing integration of the externally supplied components into the final product 
architecture. Overall, modularity is believed to help firms manage outsourcing efficiently and 
effectively thus facilitating the integration of external sources of innovation (Baldwin and Clark, 
1997, 2000; Langlois and Roberts, 1992; Sako and Murray, 1999a). 
The features and advantages of product modularity have been investigated by both the 
managerial and engineering literatures. Industry studies show that the average degree of component 
modularity varies across industries (Fixson and Park, 2008; Fixon et al., 2005; Galvin and Morkel, 
2001; Sturgeon, 2002). More specifically, while some industries as electronics (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; MacCormak et al., 2008) and bicycles (Galvin and Morkel, 2001) show high levels of 
component modularity others, as autos, stick to prevalently integral product architectures.  
As far as the automotive industry is concerned, the vehicle development outsourcing trend 
has increased both the practitioners and scholars interest toward product modularity as a tool to ease 
the integration of external sources of innovation. In the last two decades, several studies have 
analysed how and to what extent car makers design modular cars and suppliers provide component 
modularity (Camuffo, 2004; Frigant and Talbot, 2005; Fourcade and Midler, 2004; Fujimoto and 
Dongsheng, 2006). Interestingly, these studies offer contrasting empirical evidence on the diffusion 
and use of modularity in the car industry and question the benefits and feasibility of this strategy.  
In a recent study MacDuffie (2008) claims that cars remain overall integral products and shows that 
there is not a conclusive answer to key questions concerning the role of modularity in shaping the 
vertical contracting structure and inter-firm coordination of the auto industry. How and to what 
extent does product modularity shape the allocation of design tasks and inter-firm coordination in 
the auto industry? Why modularity has such a limited traction in integrating external sources of 
innovation in the automotive industry?  
This paper intends to shed light on the above issues focusing on the vehicle-component 
standard interfaces definition process. In fact, even if standard interfaces are a constitutive element 
of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Galvin, 1999; Hsuan, 1999; Momme et al., 2000; Sanchez 
and Mahoney, 1996; Ulrich, 1995), very few studies have analysed the micro and macro dynamics 
of their definition process. In order to fill this research gap, this paper focuses on how assemblers 
and suppliers define the component-vehicle interfaces in component co-development projects. We 
do so by analysing the process by which interfaces are defined in two projects concerning the co-
development of air conditioning systems (A/C systems), which is a major vehicle component. The 
two projects were carried out by Denso Thermal System, a major Japanese first tier supplier, with 
two European carmakers. We designed our research following a “quasi-experimental” logic. We 
selected two similar development projects, almost identical, on the most relevant economic and 
technological dimensions (A/C system architecture, degree of technological complexity, vehicle 
market segment, degree of carry-over from previous projects, project cost, duration, and 
performance). This research design allowed us to observe how the vehicle-component interfaces 
emerged, to what extent they were standardized in the two projects, the effects of such process on 
task and knowledge partitioning between the car-makers and the supplier, as well as on vertical 
inter-firm coordination.  
The study is organised as follows. The next section provides a review of the literature and 
presents the research questions. Section three describes the data and method. Section four and five, 
respectively, present and discuss the empirical findings. Section six concludes the study and offers 
research and managerial implications. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The unfulfilled promises of product modularity in the auto industry 
The last two decades witnessed a steady increase of vehicle development outsourcing and a 
shift of both product development tasks and knowledge from carmakers to suppliers (Takeishi, 
2001). This trend, paralleled by manufacturing outsourcing, led to dramatic de-verticalization 
processes and a re-definition of the vertical contracting structure of the auto industry towards a 
tiered configuration with global mega-suppliers (Sturgeon and Florida, 2004; Whitford, 2005). 
Therefore, as in many other sectors, to effectively integrate newly designed components inside the 
car system, the car makers and their suppliers have developed hand-in-glove relationships and 
started sharing a relevant amount of information (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). 
In this context, the reliance on modularity has been credited of many advantages. Early 
studies submitted that component modularity should ideally reduce the need for a tight coordination 
between buyer and supplier during the product development stage also in the automotive industry 
(Camuffo, 2004; Doran, 2004; Fixson et al., 2005; Ro et al., 2007; Doran, 2004; Sako and Murray, 
1999b). As Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) and Baldwin and Clark (1997; 2000) showed in different 
industries, also in the automotive industry, the specifications of standardized component interfaces 
was credited to have the potential to create an information structure that allowed coordinating the 
activities as loosely coupled: the suppliers that design and produce a modular component know ex-
ante the interfaces of the component to produce, this in turn reduces the information exchanges 
needed to design a component that fits the overall product design. Since components’ design and 
development can be isolated and carried out separately by suppliers within a ‘frozen’ product 
architecture, the need for intense coordination is lowered. Also, standard interfaces allow increasing 
the firms’ knowledge specialization and decoupling till labelling the modularity sourcing as black-
box sourcing1 (Lamming, 1993). 
MacDuffie (2008) well summarises the theoretical and potential benefits of component 
modularity as regards the NPD activities inside the auto industry. First, component modularity 
should increase the rate of introduction of modular and incremental innovations (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990). Being modular products conceived as the sum of modules, separated by well defined 
and frozen interfaces, products can be innovated adding, up-grading, substituting, or subtracting 
components (Ulrich, 1995), without changes in the other product components. Second, component 
modularity via standard interfaces provides a form of embedded coordination that reduces the need 
of high-power integration tools to achieve coordination in development processes, thereby making 
possible the concurrent and autonomous development of components by loosely coupled 
organization structures (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Third, the concurrent and autonomous 
development of components speed the throughput time of new NPD activities thus reducing the 
NPD costs. 
Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence shows that, as concerns the automotive industry, 
modularity has produced disputable benefits (Fourcade and Midler, 2004; MacDuffie, 2008; Zirpoli 
and Becker, 2011a). A first reason for such a limited impact of modularity in the industry is pointed 
out by MacDuffie (2008): few cars’ components are truly modular and autos are integral products. 
When the de-verticalization process took place inside the auto industry, while it seemed as if the 
auto industry would soon mimic the computer industry and converge to a modular configuration, in 
practice this did not happen. In fact, despite the efforts of some US and European carmakers, 
modularization has not been implemented successfully, with rare exceptions (Sako and Murray 
                                                 
1 Here we define “black-box sourcing” as an approach in which different subjects/firms can design product’s 
components independently from one another. A black-box approach allows developing a product’s components without 
knowing the other components technology and working principles. Therefore, in a black-box approach not only the 
development activities of the diverse components are separated but even the respective knowledge domains.  
1999; Sako, 2004). But it is not still clear why cars are today overall integral products despite the 
carmaker’s interest toward modularity. 
A second, and related explanation relates to the object of integration that modularity enables. 
Zirpoli and Becker’s  (2011a) empirical evidence shows that modular product design is not the most 
appropriate way to deal with the issue of integrating the overall vehicle performance (or functions): 
for this purpose the assessment of the reciprocal interdependencies between the performances of the 
different components and systems is difficult ex ante. As a consequence, there are intrinsic limits in 
the benefits of standardized interfaces as this action risks to not standardise the performance 
contribution of each single module to the whole. Standardizing interfaces does not, therefore, 
diminish reciprocal interdependencies between component- and systems-performances. Building on 
different evidence Zirpoli and Camuffo (2009) confirm that in the automotive industry the need for 
‘thick’ supply relationships persists, no matter how modular components are. The reason is that 
product architecture is not the main determinants of task and knowledge partitioning in the observed 
relationships. 
These contributions echo similar findings in other industries (e.g. Brusoni, 2005; Brusoni et 
al., 2001; Prencipe, 2000) and represent a first step in understanding how and to what extent 
product modularity shapes the allocation of design tasks and inter-firm coordination and why 
modularity might show some limited traction in coordinating the integration of external sources of 
innovation in the case of complex products. Notably, the file rouge that cut across this literature is 
an explicit criticism towards the over reliance of some literature on the concepts of modularity, and 
standard interfaces, as tools for easing inter-firm coordination.  
Although modularity literature considers standard interfaces one of the constitutive elements 
of modularity and a means for easing design outsourcing, to date, with very few exceptions 
(MacCormack et al., 2010; Zirpoli and Camuffo, 2009), there is a substantial lack of studies that 
provide empirical evidence on the process by which standard interfaces are defined by OEMs and 
suppliers and how this process does, or does not, shape the way the OEM integrates external 
sources of innovation. The research presented in this paper represents an attempt to start filling this 
empirical gap. The next section reviews the literature that has dealt specifically with the issue of 
interfaces definitions, connects it to the modularity literature and introduces the empirical work. 
 
2.2. The key role of interfaces standardization within product modularity  
Products are complex systems in that they comprise a large number of components with 
many interactions between them. The scheme by which a product’s functions are allocated to its 
components is called its “architecture” (Ulrich, 1995). Modularity refers to the way in which a 
product design is decomposed into different parts or modules. 
Research at the crossroads of management and engineering proposes a variety of definitions 
of product modularity, highlighting what features may characterize a product’s component as “a 
module” (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Gershenson et al., 2004; Fixson, 2007; Mikkola, 2006; 
Salvador, 2007; Ulrich, 1995). While authors vary in their definitions of modularity, they tend to 
agree on the concepts that lie at its heart; the notion of interdependence within modules and 
independence between modules. Baldwin and Clark (2000), as well as Sosa et al. (2004) argue that 
“modules” are characterized by independence across and interdependence within their defined 
boundaries. This independence is achievable through the adoption of interfaces that decouple the 
development and the inner working principles of a product’s components.  
There are different types of modularity-in-design. Ulrich and Tung (1991) propose a 
classification based on how the final product configuration is built. Their typology distinguishes 
between component-swapping, fabricate-to-fit, bus and sectional modularity, and captures different 
possible approaches to combining modules. Ulrich’s (1995) typology relies on the nature of the 
interfaces among components as the classification criterion and distinguishes between slot, sectional 
and bus modularity. Salvador et al. (2002) complement these typologies introducing the notion of 
combinatorial modularity as a sub-type of slot modularity and contrasting it with component 
swapping modularity. In combinatorial modularity each product component is a variant within a 
component family and each component family interacts with a subset of other component families. 
The interactions are ensured by standardized interfaces that may differ depending on the 
combination of families they connect but are independent of the component variant chosen, so that 
“all component families are allowed to vary while the interface between specific pairs of component 
families is standardized” (Salvador et al., 2002: 571). 
Despite the differences in approaches, defi nitions and emphasis, scholars converge in 
identifying three main features of modules: they are separable from the rest of the product; they are 
isolable as self-contained, semi-autonomous chunks; and they are re-com binable with other 
components. Separability, isolability, and re-com binability are properties deriving from  the way 
functions are m apped onto the components and from  how com ponents interact, i.e. from  their  
interfaces. 
Ideally, a perfectly modular product is made of components that perform entirely one or few 
functions (1:1 component/function mapping), with interfaces among them well known, defined, and 
codified (Ulrich, 1995). If these interfaces –i.e. the communication protocols among components- 
are widely diffused within a given industry, these components have open standard interfaces. 
However, if the protocols are designed specifically to suit a certain firm’s requirements, i.e. they are 
firm specific, these protocols are closed and non-standard -unless we consider closed interfaces as 
proprietary standards used by a single firm or a specific network of firms (Fine et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, modular products are characterized by standard interfaces among components, but the 
other product’s features and attributes –including technologies- may change. Thus, a modular 
component is not necessarily standard.  
Therefore, since the modularity literature converges in identifying standard interfaces as a 
core technical attribute of a module (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Fixson et al., 2005; Salvador, 
2007; Ulrich, 1995), investigating the nature of the interfaces definition process is critical to 
understand the connection between modularity and component development outsourcing and the 
integration of external sources of innovation. Within the modularity literature, Baldwin and Clark 
(1997) were the first to underline that standard interfaces allow modules to be designed 
independently and, consequently, “mixed and matched” to create a complete product-system. Hsuan 
(1999) and Momme et al. (2000) also observe that, in modular design, it is standard interfaces that 
allow for a range of variations in components to be combined in a product architecture. Salvador 
(2007) goes even further with his “interfaces standardization approach”, describing how the view of 
product modularity as interfaces standardization originated in the computer industry, was developed 
by the economic literature during the ’80s, and became widespread in the strategic management 
literature with Garud and Kumaraswamy (1993). Finally, Pimmler and Eppinger (1994) emphasised 
the role of interfaces in the engineering literature, creating specific tools to analyse them, such as 
the Design Structure Matrix (DSM).   
Overall, since interfaces are the coupling protocols among components that ensure that they 
will work together well, if interfaces are defined ex-ante and stable (i.e. trough out the life of a 
project), the development of each component can be de-coupled and conducted independently. 
Consequently, standard interfaces should ease the outsourcing of NPD activities to suppliers, 
favouring vertical disintegration  (Langlois and Roberts, 1992). 
Interfaces definition can be ensured in three ways. First, interfaces may be defined adopting 
open standard interfaces, i.e. adopting the communication protocols among components widely 
diffused within a given industry (Fine, 1995). Second, interfaces may be close standard i.e. a firm 
designs communication protocols among components that, although firm specific, represent internal 
standard requirements that are replicated across products and projects (Takeishi and Fujimoto, 
2003). Third, interfaces may be stable, i.e. well defined but not necessarily standard (neither open 
nor close). In this case they are firm specific, newly designed to suit the need of a specific 
development project, but frozen once the project starts (Christensen et al., 2002).  
This study, though focusing on how components interact (i.e. their interfaces), also 
considers components’ separability, isolability, and recombinability as properties that derive on 
how functions are mapped onto components.  
 3. DATA AND METHOD 
Our research questions seek to shed light on the role of modularity in integrating external 
sources of innovation and on the reasons of its limited traction inside the automotive industry, 
focusing on the macro and micro dynamics of the interfaces definition process during the NPD 
activities. Indeed, we opted for a qualitative method, the multiple case study research design, which 
is considered an appropriate way to describe and explore new phenomena and build testable 
theoretical propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994; Handfield and Melnyk, 1998; Meredith, 
1998). In order to observe the actual role, strengths and weaknesses of component modularity we 
built our sample following the principles of experimentation. More specifically, we adopted a 
“quasi-experimental design” approach (Romanelli and Tushman, 1986). After selecting one of the 
most modular components in the car industry, the Air Conditioning system (A/C system) (Fourcade 
and Midler, 2004), we built a research setting in which, keeping constant the variables related to 
product architecture and technology, and being other things equal, we could observe how and if task 
and knowledge partitioning and the inter-organizational coordination mechanisms vary in the two 
observed projects.  
In order to do so, we followed a three-step process. First, we decided what 
component/system to analyse. Second, we defined under which conditions two development 
projects would be comparable. Finally, we sought and found the field setting in which to apply our 
research design. 
 
3.1. Object of analysis  
The choice of the component/system to analyse was critical to make the analysis meaningful 
and the cross-OEMs’s comparison fruitful. Following Takeishi and Fujimoto’s (2003) observation 
that a vehicle can be decomposed using different levels of granularity (from a single component 
such as a brake calliper to a front module made of many heterogeneous components), we opted for a 
relatively aggregate level of analysis and chose to analyze a complex component, i.e. a system made 
of a significant number of sub-components involving heterogeneous technologies. Indeed, in the 
development of such systems, car makers usually involve several suppliers and face challenging 
inter-firm coordination problems. At this aggregate level, practitioners and scholars tend to 
converge in maintaining that a vehicle is made of a limited number of components/systems such as 
the occupant safety system, the brake system, the power train, the heat, ventilation and air 
conditioning, the doors, the cockpit, the front end, etc.  
With our research questions in mind we selected as object of the analysis the Air 
Conditioning System (A/C System). The air conditioning system has a stable architecture and a 
mature technological content and can be characterized as a relatively modular, fully 
“outsourceable” vehicle component (Doran, 2004; Fuorcade and Midler, 2004).  
Our preliminary interviewees confirmed that A/C system interfaces with the other vehicle 
components can be clearly defined and codified by OEMs as regards performance requirements and 
technical specifications. In fact, when we approached the designated A/C supplier, Denso Thermal 
System (henceforth DNTS), a major global supplier of thermal systems for the automotive industry, 
we preliminarily addressed the issue of the A/C system architecture and its implications for buyer-
supplier coordination. We first analyzed if and to what extent the A/C system could be considered 
“modular” and then what modularity meant in practice, what use of this conceptual tool was made 
and if modularization, as defined in product design literature, had represented a significant trend in 
auto A/C systems’ development. During these preliminary interviews, DNTS’s R&D chief 
confirmed that among the various main systems of a car, the A/C system could be considered 
among the most fully “outsourceable” and loosely coupled with the rest of the vehicle. 
 
3.2. Co-development projects’ selection 
The second step was to set the context for our comparative analysis. We selected, with the 
help of DNTS’s R&D chief, two distinct development projects, started approximately at the same 
time, in which DNTS was developing, respectively, the A/C system for two car models at that time 
being engineered by two competing OEMs (ALPHA and BETA). Both A/C systems were targeted 
to vehicles of the same market segment, and were characterized by similar technology and degree of 
novelty. The two projects were typical, i.e. a good proxy for the usual way DNTS and its customers 
co-develop an A/C system. With these criteria in mind, we selected the following projects: 
· Project-A refers to the development of the A/C system for a new ALPHA light commercial 
vehicle with a passengers use variant. The project was launched in 2003 as a derivative of an 
existing product platform. Currently, the previous project and Project-A represent about 2% 
of the total DNTS’s revenues and 40% of the DNTS’s volumes with ALPHA. 
· Project-B refers to the development of the A/C system for a new BETA light commercial 
vehicle with a passengers use variant and a direct competitor of the above described Alpha 
model. Also this project was launched in 2003 and was derived from an existing A/C 
platform. DNTS was the only supplier for the analyzed project. Currently, Project-B 
accounts for approximately 6% of DNTS’s total revenues, while it represents about 90% of 
DNTS’s business with BETA.  
Overall, our research design created the conditions for a meaningful analysis of cross-OEM 
variation as it allows to compare the two OEMs’ patterns of coordination referring to two co-design 
projects that share the same supplier (DNTS), the same modular component (A/C system), a similar 
component architecture2 and technological complexity, a similar project degree of novelty, 
carryover, year of start, etc. and similar project performance targets. 
As regards data sources and gathering, we analyzed company documents and conducted 
several rounds of structured and semi-structured interviews between November 2007 and April 
2008. An additional round of interviews and meeting was conducted in May 2009. Table 1 lists the 
managers we interviewed and the duration of the interviews. We decided to interview both the 
projects ‘account managers’ (responsible for the commercial relationship with the OEM from the 
                                                 
2 Today there are two main A/C systems architectures: centered and semi-centered. Both projects selected employed a 
centered architecture. 
pre-offer phase until the end of the project) and the ‘project managers’ (responsible for component 
or system development). As Table 1 shows we did not interview managers at the car makers. In 
fact, as we were interested in triangulating data on two projects, only DNTS’ managers could 
provide us the comparative perspective we needed.  
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
4. FINDINGS 
In this section, after illustrating the genesis of DNTS’s relationships with ALPHA and 
BETA, we break down the presentation of our findings articulating them into four sub-sections: the 
first reports on how design and engineering tasks were partitioned between DNTS and the 
carmakers in the two projects; the second on the implications of between-firm task partitioning on 
the architecture of the A/C system; the third on the performances of the two projects; and the fourth 
on the cross-relation differences about the applied inter-firm coordination tools. During our 
fieldwork the interviewees confirmed that the two projects were fully representative of the “usual” 
division of labour and coordination mechanisms employed in the relationship between DNTS and 
the two analyzed car makers. 
 
4.1. The genesis of DNTS’s relationships with ALPHA and BETA 
DNTS was established in 1987 as Magneti Marelli Climatizzazione. In 1990 a joint venture 
was set up with the Japanese Denso Corporation (Nippondenso, at the time), world leader in the 
industry, leading the company into a phase of rapid growth of investments in R&D structures, new 
production facilities, technologies and competencies, and a stronger presence in the European 
Market. In 2001 Denso acquired full ownership of the company that adopted the name Denso 
Thermal Systems S.p.A. Nowadays, DNTS designs, develops, manufactures and sells air- 
conditioning systems, engine cooling systems, heat exchangers, radiators and compressors for cars, 
commercial and industrial vehicles and also for tractors, earth moving machinery, buses etc. It is 
also active in designing and assembling integrated cockpit and front-end modules for cars. DNTS 
supplies all the major automotive manufacturers in Europe and South America. In the following 
paragraphs we present in detail the genesis of the two projects analysed. 
Project A was developed by DNTS for ALPHA in 2003 from an existing product platform. 
Denso was the only supplier for both projects. ALPHA launched the Request for Quotation (RFQ) 
of project A in 2003 and a handful of suppliers (Behr, Valeo, and DNTS) replied to the request 
within 3-4 months. According to the sales & marketing manager that had the commercial 
responsibility of the project, DNTS acquired the business for three main reasons. First, ALPHA 
positively evaluated the type of mixture air system proposed by DNTS. Second, the prototype 
developed by DNTS had the highest performance levels. Third, DNTS could leverage the fact of 
being co-located with ALPHA, being the only supplier that had decided to open a new production 
site closed-by ALPHA’s assembly plant. In this phase ALPHA did not fix a target price and DNTS 
suggested its own price. DNTS could offer a particularly interesting price also because of the cost 
advantage due to production co-location. DNTS won the RFQ in 2003, and was selected by 
ALPHA 48 months before the expected production start and ramp-up. 
Project B was developed by DNTS for BETA. DNTS was the only supplier for the analyzed 
project. The project was derived from a pre-existing platform developed by DNTS’s competitor. In 
2003 BETA launched the RFI (Request for Information). As usual, during this step BETA involved 
five competing suppliers (DNTS, Valeo, Behr, Delphi, Carlsonic) providing them with business 
information among which volume forecast for the A/C system. The suppliers were asked to suggest 
the best technical solution and the price. Once this phase was completed, BETA chose the best 
technical solution and launched the RFQ. DNTS won the RFQ at the end of 2004. The development 
of the A/C system took about two years. The BETA’s production started in 2007. According to the 
sales and marketing manager that had the responsibility of the project, DNTS was able to acquire 
the above business thanks to its superior technical knowledge, its cooperative approach, and its 
price. He also told that, although price was an important variable, only suppliers that had previously 
demonstrated their technical capabilities could participate to the RFQ. In fact, BETA employs such 
a complex supplier’s evaluation system and certification procedure that: “to be a BETA’s supplier 
you need to pass a strict exam every 5-6 years. Therefore BETA assumes that you are able to 
develop the A/C system required and this is why, given that, they push price competition”.  
Overall, DNTS’s relationships with ALPHA and BETA are long-lasting, collaborative, and 
solidly grounded on the technical knowledge and price competitiveness. Consequently, DNTS 
knows well both car-makers, their procedures and their technical competences.  
 
4.2 Design and engineering task partitioning in Project-A and Project-B 
4.2.2 Interface definition 
This section reports in detail how DNTS, ALPHA and BETA respectively partition their 
design and engineering tasks. In line with our research questions, we start describing how the two 
carmakers and DNTS set the interfaces between the A/C system and other vehicle systems with 
which the air conditioning interacts. For each firm, we gathered the data using a table, which 
represents a modified version of the Design Structure Matrix (DSM), a tool specifically suggested 
by the literature to analyse interfaces (Pimmler and Eppinger, 1994). The table we used is structured 
as follows: the car’s components with which the A/C system interacts are reported in the rows, 
while columns contain the indication of the type of interfaces that exist between the A/C system and 
the vehicle components (listed in rows). Following Pimmler and Eppinger (1994), we analyzed four 
types of interactions between the A/C system and the car’s components: a) spatial (e.g. physical 
adjacency, alignment, orientation); b) energetic (e.g. heat, vibration, electricity); c) material (e.g. 
air, oil, fluids, flows); and d) informative (e.g. signals, controls transfers). Indeed, we analysed the 
interfaces as follows. First, for each component with which the A/C system interacts we identified 
the kinds of interaction (spatial, material, energetic, informative). Second, for each kind of 
interaction we checked if it represents an open standard (O-S) (i.e. the interface is a standard used 
by companies operating in the industry), or closed (C-S) (i.e. the interface is a standard within the 
OEM projects), or non standard (N-S) interface. Finally, either if the interface was standard or not 
we checked for its stability over time (i.e. across the project life-cycle) employing a 1-5 point scale 
where 5 stands for “frozen interface from the start of the project” and 1 stands for “unstable 
interface that often changes during the project”3. In order to reduce the subjectivity of the interfaces 
characterization and to ensure the results comparability, we asked to the chiefs of Project-A and 
Project-B to fill in the tables under our supervision so that the interfaces could be evaluated 
consistently in the two projects. Also, once the tables were compiled, we organized a meeting with 
the two chiefs and DNTS’s R&D Chief, to compare the tables and, eventually, to fine tune them. 
This meeting allowed to taking into consideration the different perceptions the two project 
managers might have about the use of the applied metrics.  
This process ended up with the final release of the two tables (see Table 2 and Table 3) that 
summarise and compare the interfaces between the two projects. Each table took about two hours to 
be completed and other 2 hours to be adjusted in the final meeting.  
 
Project-A 
Table 2 reports the results obtained for Project A’s interfaces analysis.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 shows that all the interfaces analysed were frozen from the beginning of the project 
and that 10 up to 18 interfaces were either open or closed standard. Our interviewees were 
unanimous in stating that ALPHA fixed the product’s architecture and the interfaces in great detail. 
All the managers we interviewed stressed ALPHA’s ability in well defining the specifics early in 
                                                 
3 Usu ally, th e stability req uirement is cap tured thro ugh standardization. Nev ertheless, it may h appen th at ev en an  
interface never employed before (i.e. non standard) could be designed by the car maker and frozen at the beginning of 
the project. In this case we have an i nterface that, as the s tandard interfaces, is stable a nd can ease t he integration of 
external sources of innovation reducing the project’s uncertainty. But it is also possible that an OEM adopts a closed set 
of standa rds for a speci fic interface a nd, after comm itting to one of t hese inte rfaces it later decides to replace this  
interface with another belonging to the same set. In this case we would observe a standard interface that does not imply 
the benefits of  the ex-ante defined, “frozen”, interfaces.    
the project (interfaces, functions, performance levels, etc.). This data is confirmed by the Chief of 
Project-A who reported to us: “For ALPHA the specifics remain stable after the avant phase” (48 
months before the ramp up) and “ALPHA is a strict OEM that does not change its specifics: once 
the specifics are set, these do not change for all the suppliers involved in the car development”. 
Notably, the managers claimed that the specifics constitute one of the main coordination tools used 
by ALPHA. In fact, the R&D chief of the project explained to us that “ALPHA has a main set of 
specifics for the A/C system that is articulated in dossiers, one for each component. The main set of 
specifics contains the general requirements and standards for the system. Indeed, the architecture is 
completely defined ex-ante by ALPHA while the supplier has the task to design and engineer most 
of the inner components of the A/C system, respecting the detailed specifics given by ALPHA”. The 
interfaces, defined within the main set of specifics, are well specified also because ALPHA first 
designs the other vehicle components and then the A/C system. Of course, DNTS’s managers noted 
that the higher the numbers of frozen interfaces the lower the design’s degrees of freedom left to 
DNTS.  
Moreover, ALPHA defines some A/C system’s inner components. According to the Chief of 
Project-A “ALPHA defines these components to better control the A/C system’s architecture and to 
control those components whose performance has the higher impact on the passengers’ comfort”. 
Notably, the interviewee stressed that “ALAPHA does not define these components only to achieve 
higher levels of commonality among different platforms, […] Interfaces standardization is not 
aimed at improving the modularity level of the A/C system per se but as a mean to better control the 
overall A/C system performance”. 
ALPHA’s ability in defining the A/C system architecture and specifics was fully 
acknowledged by DNTS. The engineering managers reported to us that when they tested the A/C 
system on the car the results were totally positive. DNTS’s managers also said that, during Project-
A, they were highly confident that the test results would have been good as “their [ALPHA’s] 
specifics were clear and did not change. Moreover, we strictly followed their specifics”. ALPHA’s 
ability in setting and standardize the specifics is also well captured by the R&D chief of the 
project’s observation that “ALPHA on the same platform has several groups made by different 
suppliers that are interchangeable even if the systems (i.e. the A/C systems) are not the same. This 
is because ALPHA well defines all the specifics that are available to all the suppliers”.  
Figure 1 sketches ALPHA’s approach in defining the A/C system architecture.  
 
Insert Figure 1 approximately here 
 
The main rectangle delimited by the green frame represents the A/C system interfaces, the 
small rectangles represent the inner A/C system sub-components, and the oval the overall 
performance parameters and engineering solutions. Figure 1 shows that ALPHA fully specified all 
the interfaces (the green zone), some active components (the blue boxes inside the A/C system 
boundaries), and the performance parameters as well as the engineering solutions (the yellow 
zones). The white zones were those fully managed by DNTS.  
 
Project-B 
 Table 3, which refers to the analysis of Project-B interfaces, shows a rather different picture. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 shows that 20 up to 23 interfaces were either closed or open standard. But, 
interestingly enough, 12 up to 23 interfaces had a stability level equal or lower than 3 and 8 
interfaces were standard with a stability score equal or lower than 3. As previously explained, an 
interface is standard but unstable when substitutes another standard interface during the project 
development. According to Project-B’s R&D chief, during the project, BETA allows all 
components suppliers suggesting components interfaces changes. This data is consistent with the 
information that  “BETA started Project-B with hypotheses that had to be defined in more details 
with the suppliers involvement”. Indeed, during Project-B the initial A/C system architecture 
evolved, and DNTS was involved in these architectural changes. This explains why Project B 
interfaces were unstable.  
Moreover, Project BETA R&D chiefs explained that the components, with which the A/C 
system interacts, as the flame damper, are strictly related to the car’s design and style and are 
modified in every car-model. Consequently, “every time the cockpit supplier suggests changes in 
the cockpit style, these require changes in the A/C system”. Indeed, A/C system’s frozen interfaces 
may negatively affect the cockpit design innovativeness. Overall, DNTS people agreed that a black-
box approach was not feasible in BETA: “it would have been too risky to develop the A/C system as 
a black box. … Only through opening the black-box DNTS can help BETA evaluate and decide 
exactly the consequences of the BETA’s requirements: the black-box approach does not allow 
BETA understanding the impact that some changes required at the vehicle system level might have 
on the overall A/C performance, while an intense information sharing helps BETA in better defining 
the final A/C system’s configuration”.  
The manager stressed the evidence that BETA and DNTS have different bodies of 
knowledge, but since they do not develop isolated tasks, they need to integrate their knowledge 
domains to effectively integrate the car’s components.  
Figure 2 sketches the BETA approach in defining the A/C system architecture. The main 
rectangle delimited by the green frame represents the A/C system interfaces, the small rectangles 
represent the inner A/C system sub-components, and the oval the overall engineering solutions. 
BETA sets the A/C system main concept and architecture but allow, and in some cases ask for, 
DNTS’s suggestions about how to improve the system even at the performance and architectural 
level (the yellow zone). Also, BETA co-develops the interfaces with DNTS (the green zone) and 
does not define the A/C system inner components (there is no blue box inside the A/C system 
boundaries). The white zones are those fully managed by DNTS.  
Insert Figure 2 approximately here 
4.2.2 Functional isolation  
After the interfaces analysis, we studied the two A/C systems’ level of functional isolation 
directly interviewing the R&D chiefs of the ALPHA and BETA projects. Our interviews 
highlighted that – in both cases - the interfaces standardization was not coupled with a complete 
functional isolation though and that both carmakers were aware of the need of addressing functional 
interdependences between the A/C system and the rest of the vehicle.  
On one hand the R&D chief of Project-A explained that “the A/C system shares several 
functions with other components, and the integration issues are all managed by ALPHA that defines 
the A/C system performances and interfaces knowing the interdependencies with the other car 
components. […] When the OEM defines the specifics for the compressor, it knows that the 
compressor interacts with the A/C system, therefore sets the right specifications for both the A/C 
system and the compressor”. On the other, the R&D chief of Project-B explained that BETA 
managed the A/C system integration into the vehicle relying on DNTS competences. DNTS helped 
BETA in understanding how the A/C system would have performed given the specifics of the 
components with which the A/C system shares its functions.  
Hence, our data highlights noteworthy differences between APLHA and BETA. ALPHA’s 
in depth technological knowledge of the A/C system enabled the carmaker to manage all the key 
interdependencies. The R&D chief of Project-A stressed that ALPHA’s level of architectural 
knowledge was higher than DNTS’s one while ALPHA’s knowledge about the A/C system’s 
structural and functional coordination with the main components of the A/C System was similar to 
DNTS’s. The Project-A sales & marketing manager explained that ALPHA deepen and maintain its 
technical knowledge directly cooperating with some second tier suppliers, especially to develop 
new components: “ALPHA is integrating internal competences till being able to develop the 
components inside the A/C system”. “They are increasing their integration level to be more 
competent and competitive, and they have the resources to do it.” Back to the results showed in 
Table 2, DNTS interviewees told us that it was due to its technical knowledge that ALPHA was 
able to define all the A/C system interfaces so neatly. ALPHA’s high competences on the A/C 
system technology put the company in the position of designing interfaces between the A/C system 
and the rest of the vehicle and, consequently, to address the most of the A/C system’s functional 
interdependences upfront. BETA, vice versa, knowing that it lacked the necessary component 
specific knowledge for developing technical specifications and addressing functional 
interdependencies upfront, hinged on fluid interfaces and on a higher contribution of DNTS in the 
definition of the A/C system components.  
We also took the opportunity to ask DNTS managers, on the basis of their experience, 
knowledge of ALPHA and BETA, and of the industry, what were the main determinants of such 
different A/C systems co-development approaches between ALPHA and BETA. The explanation 
we were provided goes back to the priority attached by ALPHA and BETA to the A/C system 
performance. While ALPHA explicitly considers the A/C system performance a key feature of its 
vehicles, which its customers perceive as a distinctive characteristic of their brands, BETA, 
historically, does not put such an emphasis on the A/C system performance. This can be a 
reasonable explanation of why ALPHA has kept under stronger control the A/C system technology. 
In fact, the managers also clarified that ALPHA pursues modularity, defined as interfaces 
standardization, mainly to increase its component control. 
 
4.3. Project performance 
During our interviews, we gathered DNTS managers’ evaluations of Project-A and Project-
B outcomes, which were similarly good. The interviewees were satisfied with both the A/C 
systems, and the project development targets (time, cost, quality) were met in both cases. In 
absolute terms, Project-A had more ambitious technical specifications (perceived quality of air 
conditioning by the final customer) but, overall, the performances of the two projects were 
definitely similar.  
Also DNTS considered ALPHA’s and BETA’s approaches to knowledge and architectural 
management as consistent because they were well integrated. ALPHA couples high level of 
component specific knowledge with the ex-ante definition of the A/C system architecture, while 
BETA couples lower levels of component specific knowledge with a higher reliance on the 
supplier’s competences to modify and adjust the A/C system architecture. As the concept of 
consistency ran the risk to remain vague, we also asked DNTS managers for a counter example 
(inconsistency). For example, DNTS considered the OEM GAMMA’s approach rather inconsistent 
because GAMMA wanted to define upfront all the interfaces but it lacks the know-how. Thus, this 
approach created a lot of problems for DNTS when working with those interfaces that inevitably 
had to change when unexpected trade-offs came out and DNTS had to do a lot of re-design. The 
project was late and more expensive than expected. 
Finally, we explicitly asked DNTS engineers their perception about modularity, what they 
meant by “modularity” and what they expected to gain from a modular approach. They told us that 
modular designs would greatly reduce the necessity to interact with clients because in case of 
modular designs the car maker would define the specifics, and the suppliers might interpret these 
autonomously. Particularly, DNTS views modularity as a property that gives to the OEM the task to 
design the interfaces and the performances, while it leaves to the supplier the freedom to decide 
how to meet the performance targets. The R&D chief of project ALPHA said, “the car maker 
should define the A/C system functions and the performances leaving us the possibility to find the 
best technical solution”. But when we asked to refer back to the “real world” practice we were told 
that “nobody [in the auto industry] has this approach. I believe that modularity is mainly diffused in 
the electronic industry but in our industry we have not already found the right level to have true 
black boxes because OEMs need more experience. ALPHA is near the modularity approach but 
they are intrusive, they should make a step back…. An OEM needs several competences to 
modularise a system… ALPHA, for example, has a modular approach in defining the interfaces but, 
to fix the product architecture, their specifics go inside the A/C system”.  
The R&D chief when solicited on this point acknowledged that “product modularity might 
allow employing a pure black-box approach but product modularization requires a high knowledge 
about the components to modularise”. Consequently, we asked whether Denso preferred an OEM 
that defines the architecture and the specifics leaving the supplier the freedom to develop the 
component in a black-box fashion, or if it prefers an approach such as that of ALPHA. “Definitively 
the first”, said the R&D chief, because a black-box approach leaves more space to the supplier. The 
manager specified that ALPHA by providing the specifics for inner A/C components limited the 
DNTS’s contribution to innovation. On the other hand, the same managers admitted that ALPHA’s 
clear and stable specifics were supportive to DNTS’s design and engineering tasks. Overall, 
DNTS’s managers acknowledged that during the project they had many opportunities for learning 
from ALPHA but in many respect they preferred BETA’s approach. 
 
4.4. Inter-firm coordination mechanisms  
ALPHA and BETA used two completely different task and knowledge partitioning schemes 
mirrored by a fundamental divergence in how the interfaces between the A/C system and the rest of 
the carmakers’ systems were defined and set. This section reports on the differences between 
ALPHA and BETA as far as the inter-firm information sharing is concerned. 
As seen, ALPHA provided to DNTS detailed and stable definition of specifications and 
interfaces. Contrary to what, following mainstream modularity literature, we had initially assumed, 
this fact did not reduce the need for intense communication during the project. Rather, the evidence 
gathered in our interviews shows that the Project-A required intense information sharing, both 
formal and informal. The formal information exchange took place through a monthly meeting to 
planning the activities, and through two other by weekly meetings aimed to solving technical issues. 
Moreover, the DNTS’s project and area chief engineers kept systematically in touch via e-mail or 
telephone calls with the corresponding ALPHA chiefs. These interactions were more frequent (daily 
interactions) and intense during the concept development and the preliminary design phases, while 
they were less frequent after that. The daily contacts usually aimed at solving problems that might 
stop the project. In fact, even if ALPHA well defines the interfaces and the specifics these do not 
ex-ante resolve all the interdependencies between the A/C system and the car. In this respect, the 
engineering manager said: “We contact ALPHA to verify to have correctly understood their 
requirements or if we need their help. The goal is to do not stop the project development till the next 
meeting”.  
Moreover, DNTS co-located the design and engineering team close to the main ALPHA 
location. DNTS rented a space and permanently staffed two engineers. In fact, despite the scheduled 
monthly meetings, frequent telephone calls, detailed interfaces definition and contractual 
agreements, DNTS’s managers highlighted the fact that face to face communication was 
unavoidable: “when Project-A was launched, we rented a space near ALPHA to be able to meet the 
client on a daily basis. The “human interfaces” consisted of two engineers coordinated by the area-
chief”. 
As far as Project-B and the relationship between DNTS and BETA are concerned, it clearly 
emerged that BETA co-developed the A/C system with DNTS and that heavily delegated design 
and engineering tasks to DNTS. The interviews confirmed that the co-development was not aimed 
at increasing BETA’s knowledge about the A/C system, but at improving the NPD efficiency. As 
seen above, BETA did not heavily invest in the A/C system’s knowledge and this had noteworthy 
consequences on how BETA managed the relationship with DNTS. As opposed to ALPHA, in fact, 
BETA cooperated with DNTS without sharing the same knowledge base concerning the A/C 
system. To do so BETA has set up a sophisticated reporting system that stores all relevant 
information concerning the cost of the components and the defects that the A/C systems reported on 
the market. The cross comparison of cost details and technical and functional problems allowed 
BETA to guide DNTS’s choices without an in depth technical knowledge about the A/C system’s 
inner components. BETA was known for having rigid systems and procedures to analyze the costs 
of the A/C system’s components and asked many details about the costs of the components that 
DNTS purchased. In this respect, BETA required ad hoc meetings to analyze the components 
chosen by DNTS, and sometimes imposed restrictions about the second tier suppliers and also 
preferences about their nationality.  
Moreover, often DNTS managers stressed BETA’s emphasis on the codification of co-
development practices into standard procedures: “every day there might be component innovations 
but every activity in the development process is totally routinized”. DNTS managers, in fact, 
emphasized that BETA had a very structured and rigorous procedure to manage its relationships 
with suppliers. BETA controlled the project status through a procedure made of five steps and a 
series of detailed milestones and required monthly meetings plus others appointments. BETA had a 
specialist for each project milestone. Moreover, BETA had several inspectors that supervised 
DNTS’s activities and progresses. DNTS believes that these structured procedures did not always 
favour a robust engineering approach to problem solving. The true value-added of each milestone 
“often depends on the specific person that manages the procedure’s step”. The heavy use of 
procedures at times made the process bureaucratic, hindering project's advancements: “they [BETA 
engineers] are good technicians but due to too many procedures sometimes risk stopping the 
project”. Overall, intense communication and frequent information sharing in all the available 
forms were a standard practice. 
 
5. DATA INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION 
Our description of the two projects shows a nuanced picture of how interfaces are defined, 
what shapes the division of development tasks, what drives knowledge partitioning between OEMs 
and suppliers and the coordination mechanisms at work. We found that the same A/C system (same 
product, same architecture, same complexity, similar vehicles targeted to the same market segment) 
was co-developed according to a different conceptual definition of the interfaces and employing 
different organizational solutions.  
We observed that the two A/C systems, despite the similarities in terms of characteristics 
and performance, were developed by DNTS on the basis of interfaces that were defined by ALPHA 
and BETA in two substantially different ways. The decision to rely on stable and detailed interfaces 
(i.e. the ALPHA’s approach) vs. fluid and changing ones (i.e. the BETA’s approach) was not linked 
to intrinsic characteristics of the system under development, but derived from deliberate choices of 
the OEMs. Such choices, in turn, were grounded on the amount of component specific knowledge 
owned by the OEM and its current involvement in component design (i.e. vertical scope).  
ALPHA designs stable and detailed interfaces. According to our company informants this 
approach worked because ALPHA had developed an in-depth knowledge of the A/C system 
architecture and components. This seems to point to the fact that a better and more effective 
definition of standard and stable interfaces is coupled with the OEM’s vertical scope (i.e. the OEM 
holds component specific knowledge). The main drawback of the ALPHA approach was the 
impossibility to tap into the supplier’s knowledge because of the limited supplier’s freedom to 
suggest new and original architectural solutions. Also, DNTS’s engineers claimed that interfaces 
standardization did not eliminate the need for frequent and intense information sharing due to the 
existence of complex functional interdependencies between the A/C system and other vehicle 
components: ALPHA’s interfaces standardization level is high but, from an architectural 
perspective, did not manage to achieve a complete functional isolation (i.e. some functions of the 
A/C system remain shared with other vehicle components). Consequently, ALPHA, in order to 
control some of the residual functional interactions, had to be involved in the definition of some 
A/C system’s  inner components becoming “intrusive”. 
In the second case, BETA provided some directions regarding the interfaces between the 
system and the rest of the vehicle in a black box sourcing fashion, i.e. without specifying the A/C 
system architecture and the inner components features. However, since the OEM knew little about 
the interdependences and interactions between the components within the system and the rest of the 
vehicle, it had to be prepared to revise and adjust systematically the A/C system architecture and 
components features through intense mutual adjustment and information sharing with DNTS, 
during the project. According to DNTS engineers, this approach increased the possibility to 
introduce important innovations and improvements. DNTS had the possibility to suggest both 
innovations at the A/C system’s inner components level as well as at the system interfaces level. 
But this approach also increased the project instability. In fact BETA allowed DENSO, as well as 
all those suppliers that produce vehicle subsystems that interact with the A/C system, to suggest 
changes in the subsystems interfaces during the project development.  
Overall, the “dispute resolution styles” (Sabel et al., 2009) characterizing the relationships 
between DNTS and the two carmakers were not determined by the nature of the A/C system 
interfaces but followed as a natural consequence of the OEMs capabilities, level of vertical 
integration, and knowledge endowment.  
While BETA tried to compensate its lack of component knowledge with an intense mutual 
adjustment and information sharing with DNTS during the project and using more sophisticated and 
structured inter-organizational procedures, ALPHA, being more in control of the technical 
interdependences, relied more on standard and stable interfaces that were complemented with a high 
information sharing but with less formal coordination.  
As seen, both relationships were considered by DNTS as cooperative and successful. 
DNTS’s managers used the term “consistent” to describe BETA and ALPHA’s behaviour. ALPHA 
and BETA were considered as consistent by DNTS because their strategic approaches, knowledge 
endowments, capabilities and organizational structures are well integrated. In other words, OEM’s 
strategy defines the knowledge endowment, which drives the organization of the vertical supply 
relationships.   
Our cases, describing how modularity is achieved, offer new insides on the role of 
modularity in integrating external sources of innovation and, also, an intuition of why, today, cars 
are still integral products (MacDuffie, 2010). While the modularity literature builds on Sanchez and 
Mahoney’s hypothesis (1996) that modular products are developed by loosely coupled 
organizations, we found that the OEM’s strategy drives the investments in the A/C system 
knowledge that determine how NPD activities are managed. Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) wrote 
‘although organisations ostensibly design products, it can also be argued that products design 
organisations’. Our cases support the proposition that firm’s strategic orientation and the level of 
vertical integration design products, and that modular design does not substitute high-power 
organization tools.  
Standard or well defined interfaces are a coordination tool, but they neither eliminate the 
need of high powered integration tools nor shape the allocation of NPD activities- i.e. the 
“mirroring hypothesis” (Colfer, 2007) does not hold in the analyzed cases. Also, standard and stable 
interfaces do no lead to the black-box sourcing. What eases buyer-supplier coordination through 
interfaces stability is the level of knowledge held by the OEM and its ability to predict the technical 
interdependences characterizing the design over the life of the project (as the DNTS-ALPHA case 
shows). As Prencipe (2000) argued studying the aircraft engine control system, manufacturers need 
a deep understanding of components' inner functioning to specify, assess, test and integrate 
components externally supplied. The OEM’s lack of component specific knowledge prevents the 
OEM from being able to envision and address upfront all the possible coupling problems. Cars 
components share a number of interfaces that require specific knowledge investments to be 
managed. These findings, thus, advance to those literature that question the possibility to 
encapsulate OEMs’ components knowledge inside standard interfaces because firms’ knowledge 
have to necessary span these boundaries (Brusoni, 2005; Prencipe 2001; Steinmueller, 2005; Zirpoli 
and Becker, 2011a) and only carmakers that know more than they do can achieve higher modularity 
levels (Brusoni, 2005; Camuffo and Zirpoli, 2009). 
Our findings also support those literature that question the role of modularity inside the car 
industry (Camuffo, 2004; Fourcade and Midler, 2004; MacDuffie, 2008). Our data suggest that cars 
are complex systems that are not nearly-decomposable in nature (Simon, 1962): the A/C system, 
one of the most modular car’s component, shares a number of interfaces and functions with other 
subsystems. This point to the many organizational challenges and costs of modularizing such 
complex products (Ethiraj, 2007; Zirpoli and Becker, 2011b). As Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004) 
pointed out, whether and how good modular designs may be achieved in the face of complexity is 
an important question. Our cases suggest that component vehicle modularity, defined as the use of 
ex-ante defined frozen interfaces, can be achieved only if the OEM has a strategic interest in 
controlling the component performance via direct and intense investments in the component 
specific knowledge.   
  
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we analysed two cases of integration of external sources of innovation focusing 
on the dynamic process of components’ interfaces definition (Baldwin, 2007; Sosa, et al., 2004). 
Under the ceteris paribus condition defined by the quasi experimental design approach, our results 
show that interfaces diverge significantly in the two cases and that their definition process is neither 
technologically determined nor the mere result of product architectural choices. In both cases, the 
OEMs and the supplier’s capabilities, degree of vertical integration, knowledge endowment and 
strategic focus drive the partitioning of the design and engineering tasks, the interfaces definition 
process, and the choice of the inter-firm coordination mechanisms.  
Our findings imply that standard or well defined interfaces, although representing a useful 
coordination tool (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996), neither substitute high 
powered integration tools nor fully shape the allocations of NPD activities across firms. This is 
consistent with the outstanding mixed evidence about the “mirroring hypothesis” (Colfer and 
Baldwin, 2010), and with the idea that the automobiles are too complex a product and that the auto 
industry is too complex a sector for modularity to be effective as a functional equivalent of high-
powered inter-firm coordination mechanisms (Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2011; MacDuffie, 2008; 
Zirpoli and Becker, 2011a, b).  
Moreover, as far as the interfaces definition is concerned, we observed that standard and 
stable interfaces do no lead to the black-box sourcing approach modularity theory would predict, i.e. 
we observe neither a clear cut partitioning of task and knowledge between buyer and supplier, nor a 
substantial decoupling of design and engineering activities across them. Paradoxically, it was the 
more vertically integrated firm that relied more heavily on vehicle-component standard interfaces. 
While component modularity and design outsourcing co-vary and complement each other in 
modularity literature, our findings suggest that they may crow out each other and are rather difficult 
to combine. Cars are not nearly decomposable in nature, and OEMs have to specifically invest in 
the components knowledge to achieve higher levels of modularity.  
These findings also suggest why modularity may still have a limited traction in the 
automotive industry (Camuffo, 2004; Fourcade and Midler, 2004; MacDuffie, 2008): a) carmakers, 
to increase vehicle components modularisation, need to heavily invest in components specific 
knowledge. Modularity and design outsourcing work as substitutes and are rather difficult to 
combine thus b) carmakers modularise only strategically relevant components. Moreover c) cars 
components share a number of interfaces that, once frozen, might negatively affect the introduction 
of innovations and/or new car styles. 
These findings have straightforward managerial implications. On one side, high levels of 
component modularity require specific investments and should be carefully driven by the firm’s 
strategy. Modularity may constraint the supplier’s innovative contribute, but can also increase the 
control over the component performances and the supplier’s substitutability. On the other side, low 
levels of component modularity can reduce the investments in the component specific knowledge 
by the OEM and increase the openness to supplier’s innovations. The drawback is the OEM’s need 
to ensure the control over the component via complex inter-organizational procedures. 
All the main findings contained in this work might be further developed and disentangled as 
concerns both the car industry and other settings. In fact, even if this study is industry specific, since 
some of the cars features, as their complexity, belong to other products, as aircrafts, this study might 
offer a new grid to analyze the appropriateness of modular strategies in other industry settings.  
Finally, we recognize that the methodology employed might limit the generalizability of our 
results and that, even if we interviewed the supplier to respect the ceteris paribus conditions of the 
quasi-experimental deign, this work might be further improved interviewing the two carmakers in-
order to further appreciate the role of modularity in the automotive industry, and the complexities of 
its definition process.  
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Table 1. List and duration of interviews at Denso 
DNTS interviewees Duration # interviews 
R&D chief  4h30min 3 
R&D chief for Alpha 2h30min 1 
R&D chief for Alpha assistant 3h30 min 2 
R&D chief for Beta 3h30min 2 
Sales & marketing manager for Alpha  2h 2 
Sales & marketing manager for Beta 2h 2 
Total 18h 12 
 
 
Table 2. Interfaces analysis of the Project-A A/C system 
The table employs a modified version of the Design Structure Matrix to analyze the interfaces between the 
Project A A/C system and the other car’s components with which it interacts. 
 Air conditioning system 
 Spatial Interfaces Informative Interfaces Energetic Interfaces Material Interfaces
Car’s components O-SC-S N-S Stability O-S C-S N-S Stability O-SC-SN-SStability O-S C-S N-S Stability
Engine cooling system     x 5         x     5    x   5  
Frigorific circuit     x 5         x      5 x      5 
Electrical box     x 5 x     5  x      5 x      5 
Flame damper     x 5                         
Instrument panel (shape)     x 5         x      5     x 5 
Instrument panel (mechanics)     x 5           x    5         
Crossbar     x 5         x      5         
O-S= open-standard interface; C-S= closed standard interface; N-S= non-standard interface 
The interfaces stability is measured employing a 1-5 scale where 5 stands for “frozen interface” and 1 stands for “unstable 
interface”. 
 
 
Table 3. Interfaces analysis of the Project B A/C system 
The table employs a modified version of the Design Structure Matrix to analyze the interfaces between the 
Project A A/C system and the car’s components with which it interacts. 
 Air conditioning system 
 Spatial Interfaces Informative Interfaces Energetic Interfaces Material Interfaces
Car’s components O-SC-S N-S StabilityO-S C-S N_S Stability O-SC-SN-SStability O-S C-S N-S Stability
Engine cooling system x     5         x     4 x     5 
Frigorific circuit x     5         x     5 x     5 
Electrical box   x   3   x   4   x   5   x   5 
Flame damper    x   5            x   2 x     5 
Instrument panel (shape)   x   3           x   3     x 1 
Instrument panel (mechanics)   x   3   x   2   x   3     x 1 
Crossbar   x   3           x   3     x 1 
O-S= open-standard interface; C-S= closed standard interface; N-S= non-standard interface. 
The interfaces stability is measured employing a 1-5 scale where 5 stands for “frozen interface” and 1 stands for “unstable 
interface”. 
Figure 1.  ALPHA approach in defining the A/C system architecture 
The main rectangle delimited by the green frame represents the A/C system interfaces, the small 
rectangles represent the inner A/C system sub-components, and the oval the overall performance 
parameters and engineering solutions. ALPHA fully specified all the interfaces (the green zone), 
some active components (the blue boxes inside the A/C system boundaries), and the performance 
parameters (the yellow zones). The white zones were those fully managed by DNTS. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. BETA approach to the A/C system co-development with DNTS.  
The main rectangle delimited by the green frame represents the A/C system interfaces, the small 
rectangles represent the inner A/C system sub-components, and the big oval the overall 
performance parameters and engineering solutions. BETA sets the A/C system main concept and 
architecture with the help of DNTS (the yellow zone). Also, BETA co-develops the interfaces with 
DNTS (the green zone) and does not define the A/C system inner components (there is no blue box 
inside the A/C system boundaries).  
 
 
 
